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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Professor Emeritus Blaine Sloan is a dear and ad-
mired friend who recruited me to serve as an Adjunct Professor
at Pace Law School, it is a particular pleasure to be invited to
deliver the annual lecture that bears his name. It is a singular
honor to follow Sloan Lectures by my friends Robert Rosen-
stock, now a member of the International Law Commission,
Professors Oscar Schachter, and Louis Henkin of Columbia,
Michael Reisman of Yale and Stephen Schwebel, now Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice, as well as other
noted and distinguished scholars of international law. The topic
I shall address is a contentious one, but upon its successful reso-
lution, may depend the future safety and welfare of
humankind.'
II. PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG
A. Early Roots
International law itself is of relatively recent origin. True it
is that Plato and Aristotle and universalist scholastics like St.
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas discussed the legality or ille-
gality of war, but these were futuristic musings more than re-
flections of an existing legal system. Hugo Grotius, "the father
of international law," recognized that peace and justice go hand
in hand. He warned, in 1646, that ". . . the state which trans-
gresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the
bulwarks of its own future peace." At the end of the 18th cen-
tury, Immanuel Kant, Jacques Rousseau and other philoso-
phers authored plans for perpetual peace, but it was Jeremy
Bentham who is credited with first use of the expression "inter-
national law" little more than two-hundred years ago. 2
1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP To-
WARD WORLD PEACE 14 (1980) [hereinafter ICC].
2 FERENCZ, supra note 1 at.
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The American revolution ushered in a dramatic era in the
rule of law. Building on the emerging ideas of liberty and de-
mocracy, thirteen independent colonies in America cast off the
yoke of the British crown and adopted a new legal system to
regulate independent states with widely different social and
political views. The people who adopted the Constitution
agreed that it was necessary that many rights of sovereignty
had to be ceded to a central government strong enough to exe-
cute its own laws by its own tribunals. The Constitution gave
Congress broad authority to define and punish "Offenses
against the Law of Nations." Ideas that inspired the legal sys-
tem that had been evolving over centuries were gradually devel-
oped by experience and judicial interpretation. Paradoxically,
acceptance of legal restraints opened liberating new horizons
for humankind.
Just about one hundred years ago, in 1899, twenty-six sov-
ereign states convened in the Hague in what was called "The
International Peace Conference." The convocation was intended
to end an unbearable arms race between Russia and France.
Aside from hortatory declarations, the Hague conferees were
not ready to curb their options to resort to force or to empower
any impartial authority to maintain the peace. They did man-
age to agree upon a Convention with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land. Upon closer examination, it did not
inhibit war but merely urged future combatants to kill them-
selves in a more humane manner. It's preamble proclaimed
that "population and belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result
from the usages established between civilized nations, from the
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public con-
science." What that meant was not spelled out and some of the
"First Peace Conference" participants were soon killing each
other in the same old way.
Because the Russians and Japanese were at war, the Sec-
ond Hague Peace Conference had to be postponed. It was con-
vened in 1907, and by that time, the number of states
participating was increased to forty-four. The United States del-
egation, instructed by its distinguished Secretary of State Elihu
Root, spoke out forcefully, as it had in 1899, in favor of settling
international disputes by binding arbitration or judicial pro-
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cess. But, the call for third-party settlements was coupled with
exceptions if the U.S. felt the issues involved "vital interests,
independence and honor" or "purely American questions."
Other nations expressed even more reservations about ac-
cepting independent judicial authority. No serious considera-
tion was given to the thought expressed by some that there
should be an international criminal court. As French diplomat
and Nobel Prize winner Le'on Bourgeois, who had been at both
Hague conferences, said: "[wle did not see clearly enough that
in the society of States just as in relations of individuals there is
no lasting peace without juridical organization ......
B. World War I
The first major effort to curb international crimes by inter-
national law arose after World War I. In 1914, Europe, divided
by competing military alliances, was a powder keg waiting to
explode. The fuse was lit when a Serbian nationalist assassi-
nated Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand on the bridge at
Sarajevo. Lacking any institution with authority to maintain
peace, the disputing parties had no choice but to call upon their
allies and resort to force. Without effective international law,
the only alternative was war.
Germany launched an attack across the neutral territory of
Luxembourg and Belgium. Soon the world was engulfed as
twenty-three nations went to war against Germany and its al-
lies. Despite ambiguous restraints enunciated in the Hague
Conventions of 1889 and 1907, improved techniques and imple-
ments of warfare became more devastating than ever before.
New weapons, such as tanks, planes, dirigibles, and subma-
rines, expanded the target areas and victimized civilian popula-
tions that were supposed to have been protected. Germany's
use of poison gas and sinking of hospital ships evoked cries of
outrage. By the time the war ended, losses were estimated at
ten million soldiers dead, ten million civilians dead, twenty mil-
lion dead from epidemic or famine and twenty million more
wounded. All hearts cried out for a more peaceful world.
Reconciliation could not even begin without first bringing
to justice those individuals whose unconscionable atrocities had
violated "the laws of humanity" and who had been responsible
for starting the war itself. The five victorious powers (France,
[Vol. 10:203
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England, Italy, the United States and Japan) convened a Peace
Conference in Versailles in 1919 and appointed a 15-member
Commission to Consider the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War. After investigation and due deliberation, the Commission,
chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, concluded:
"All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their
position ... who have been guilty of offenses against the laws
and customs of war or the laws of humanity are liable to crimi-
nal prosecution."
Although the Commissioners held that Germany had de-
clared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, they felt that
a trial on that issue would be very prolonged and difficult since
international law had not yet advanced to a stage where a pre-
meditated war of aggression ("which the public conscience re-
proves and which history will condemn") could be treated as a
punishable offense under established law. The Americans, in
particular, argued that no international court had ever before
tried a sovereign head of state for aggressive war. For the fu-
ture, however, the Commissioners recommended that penal
sanctions be provided "for such grave outrages against the ele-
mentary principles of international law."
To avoid allegations of ex post facto law, the German Kaiser
was not charged with aggression, but, instead, the Treaty of
Versailles provided that he would be arraigned "for a supreme
offense against international morality and the sanctity of trea-
ties." Other Germans who had committed war crimes or atroci-
ties would be handed over for trial by allied courts. But
Germany refused to honor the treaty and Holland, noting that
there was no competent international criminal court available
to act on the basis of existing statutes making aggression by a
sovereign punishable, refused to extradite the Kaiser. He was
never tried for anything. German officers who committed atroc-
ities were not handed over either and got off with light
sentences by a German court. The effort to deter aggression
and war crimes by international law after World War I had got-
ten off to a slow start.
Although world public opinion strongly favored President
Woodrow Wilson's proposal for a League of Nations, isolationist
sentiment by a minority of U.S. Senators blocked ratification of
the Treaty and the United States was unable to join the League.
1998]
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Hoping that it might be able to become a member later, the U.S.
became involved in all important League deliberations. Deter-
mined to seek future peace through law, the League appointed
an Advisory Committee of Jurists to draw up plans for the crea-
tion of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Jurists,
included Elihu Root and his very able assistant Dr. James
Brown Scott, who had recommended such a court at the Hague
Peace Conference in 1907.
The eminent Jurists favored an international arbitral court
with compulsory jurisdiction and Mr. Root proposed that con-
sideration also be given to the establishment of a High Court of
International Justice "to try crimes against international public
order and the universal law of nations." The idea of establish-
ing such a criminal court before rather than after the crimes
occurred had considerable appeal. But several members first
wanted to know which crimes would be prohibited by "the uni-
versal law of nations." Root argued that definitions could be de-
veloped as the court expanded its jurisdiction. He asked the key
question: "Are the Governments of the world prepared to give
up their individual sovereign rights to the necessary extent?"
The rhetorical question was left unanswered. Unfortunately for
humankind, Elihu Root's 1920 suggestion that an international
criminal court be created was quietly brushed aside by the polit-
ical leaders of the major powers.
A host of distinguished legal experts from all parts of the
world continued to argue strongly for an international court
with compulsory jurisdiction and a criminal court that could
hold individuals responsible for acts that violated the peace and
security of humankind. The Assembly of the League of Nations
declared that "a war of aggression can never serve as the means
of settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an in-
ternational crime." The Kellogg-Briand Pact, renouncing war
as an instrument of national policy, was signed in Paris in 1928
by most nations. That same year, the Pan-American Confer-
ence declared that "a war of aggression constitutes a crime
against mankind." But nothing was done to create a criminal
court to punish the perpetrators of the most serious of interna-
tional crimes. In diplomatic chambers the whisper was heard:
"The time is not yet ripe." Humankind would pay dearly for the
indecision of the decision-makers.
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C. World War II
Germany began to rearm and nations of Europe, clinging to
old traditions, formed new military alliances as the preferred
means to maintain peace. When King Alexander of Yugoslavia
and the French Foreign Minister were assassinated by a Croa-
tian nationalist while the King was on a visit to Marseilles in
1934, the world was rocked by outrage. But, the League
seemed unable to calm the nations involved, and memories of
1914 evoked great fears. France quickly drafted legal conven-
tions to prohibit such acts of terrorism and to establish an inter-
national criminal court to try offenders. The drafts were
considered and revised by members of the League in prepara-
tion for a Diplomatic Conference expected in 1937, presumably
to approve the convention and create the court. By that time,
however, passions had cooled. The only state to ratify the re-
vised terrorism convention was India. No state ratified the
Convention for an International Criminal Court. Not one! In-
action was an invitation to pending disaster.
Japan, after invading Manchuria, in violation of the Cove-
nant of the League and the Kellogg Pact, had shown its con-
tempt by walking out of the League in 1934. Italy committed
brazen aggression against Ethiopia in 1935. The limited eco-
nomic sanctions finally applied by hesitant France and England
were too little and too late. In March 1938, German troops in-
vaded Austria and in 1939 began their march of conquest over
Europe. The League was helpless. Behind the Blitzkreig of the
German tanks, Nazi extermination squads killed without pity
or remorse every Jew, Gypsy or perceived adversary they could
lay their hands on. In defiance of the accepted rules of the
Hague Conventions, millions of civilians were forced into slave
labor, millions of prisoners-of-war were murdered or starved to
death, while many millions more were simply annihilated in
gas chambers and concentration camps. In 1941, Japan at-
tacked the United States in a sneak bombardment at Pearl Har-
bor. Japanese troops engaged in massive atrocities in all areas
they occupied. It would require complete military defeat and
unconditional surrender before anything could be done to bring
the German and Japanese war criminals to justice.
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D. Germany is Warned
The leaders of the United States and Great Britain, begin-
ning in 1941, repeatedly issued public warnings that German
violations of the rules of international law would be punished
and that superior orders would be no defense. In London on
January 12, 1942, a public declaration by the "governments in
exile" of nations overrun by the Nazis made clear that one of the
principal aims of the war was "the punishment through the
channel of organized justice, of those guilty or responsible for
these crimes." Fact-finding Commissions were established and
it was made abundantly clear to all who wanted to see that it
was the Allied intent to bring to justice those who flouted estab-
lished laws of humanity. The British government assumed that
it was beyond question that Hitler and a number of other arch-
criminals, including Italy's Dictator Mussolini, would suffer the
death penalty. Rather than try such leaders in a long judicial
proceeding, the British (noted for "fair play") felt that "execu-
tion without trial is the preferable course." The United States
(noted for its "wild-west approach") preferred the rule of law.
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, a former Wall Street law-
yer, persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt that only those
who had been found guilty beyond doubt in a court of law
should be punished. The Soviet Government favored trials
before special international criminal tribunals. Roosevelt and
Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke out clearly
and eloquently, calling upon the German people to resist
Hitler's crimes and leaving no doubt of the Allies intent to place
on trial those leaders who were responsible for the aggressions
and atrocities being committed.
Allied radio and press condemned crimes by the Japanese,
especially their slaughter and rape of the Chinese at Nanking
and the brutal torture and murder of civilians and American
soldiers and fliers. On March 24, 1944, the German people were
explicitly told that there would be an accounting for "the sys-
tematic murder of the Jews of Europe." Yet, the crimes contin-
ued unabated. It could not have come as a surprise to any of the
German or Japanese defendants to find themselves in the dock
after the war and to have to answer for their deeds in a court of
law.
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III. THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNALS
A. The International Military Tribunal (IMT)
It took just about six weeks of negotiation in London for the
victorious allies, each represented by distinguished jurists, to
reach agreement on a Protocol for establishing the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal and defining its jurisdiction, powers
and general procedures. Only three categories of crimes were to
be punished:
1. Crimes against Peace (planning, preparing and waging ag-
gressive war);
2. War Crimes (condemned in Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907); and
3. Crimes Against Humanity (such as genocide) which by their
magnitude shock the conscience of humankind.
Each provision of the 30-articles was carefully considered
in order to reach an accord that seemed fair and acceptable to
the four partners representing the United States, Great Brit-
ain, France and the Soviet Union. On the eighth day of August
1945, the Charter was signed and the first International Mili-
tary Tribunal in the history of humankind was thereby
inaugurated.
On October 18, 1945, twenty-four major Nazi war criminals
were accused of conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace,
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as detailed in the
indictment. A Chief Prosecutor had been appointed for each of
the four victorious powers. The Chief Prosecutor for the United
States, and the principal architect of the London Charter, was
Robert H. Jackson, on leave from the U.S. Supreme Court. He
set the tone and goals:
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with in-
jury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their cap-
tive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most
significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason . . . We
must never forget that the record on which we judge these defend-
ants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow.
To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own
lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual
1998]
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integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself to poster-
ity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice. 3
And so it did!
The trial was open for all to see. The record, in four lan-
guages, was available for all to read. The defendants were rep-
resented by able counsel of their own choosing. The judgment,
handed down a year after the trial began, was clear, compre-
hensive and persuasive. It was rendered by prominent jurists
of high calibre. The accused men, who were responsible for the
cruelest crimes ever seen on the face of the earth, were given
the kind of a trial which they, in the days of their pomp and
power, never gave to anyone. It has withstood the test of time as
a fair articulation of evolving international law.
In its comprehensive judgment, the Tribunal traced the
history of international criminal law and the growing recogni-
tion in treaties, conventions and declarations, that aggressive
war was an illegal act for which even a head of state could be
brought to account. There was no longer anything ex post facto
about such a charge. Leaders who deliberately attacked neigh-
boring states without cause must have known that their deeds
were prohibited and it would be unjust to allow them to escape
merely because no one had been charged with that offense in
the past. "The law is not static," said the Tribunal, "but by con-
tinued adaptation follows the needs of a changing world." Ag-
gressive war was condemned as "the supreme international
crime."
The evidence, based in large part on captured German
records, was overwhelming that crimes of the greatest cruelty
and horror had been systematically committed pursuant to offi-
cial policy. The IMT, citing the Hague Conventions and prevail-
ing customs of civilized nations, rejected Germany's argument
that rules of war had become obsolete and that "total war" was
legally permissible. Regarding Crimes against Humanity (such
as extermination and enslavement of civilian populations on
political, racial or religious grounds), the law took another step
forward on behalf of humankind, a step that was long overdue.
The findings and judgment of the IMT helped to usher in a new
era for the legal protection of fundamental human rights.
3 R. H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS, 3-7 (1946).
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The lead IMT defendant, Field Marshal Hermann Goering,
after he was sentenced to be hanged, committed suicide.
Hitler's Deputy Martin Bormann, who had mysteriously disap-
peared, was sentenced to death, in absentia. Other defendants
were hanged or sentenced to long prison terms. Some were ac-
quitted and released. The Charter was adhered to by nineteen
other nations, and both the Charter and judgment of the IMT
were unanimously affirmed by the first General Assembly of the
United Nations. They have become expressions of binding com-
mon international law.
B. Twelve Subsequent Trials at Nuremberg
As the trial against Goering et al. was drawing to a close, it
was recognized that Nazi crimes of such enormity could only
have been committed in collaboration with large segments of
German society. The four Allies, however, were unable to agree
on joint subsequent trials. As a compromise, the quadripartite
Control Council that governed Germany enacted a law author-
izing each of the four Powers to carry on with such prosecution
in its own zone of occupation as it might see fit. The United
States decided to conduct a dozen subsequent trials in the Nu-
remberg courthouse.
The London Charter of the IMT, supplemented by Control
Council Law Number 10, provided the jurisdictional basis for
the subsequent proceedings. The defendants included German
doctors responsible for illegal medical experiments, lawyers and
judges who had perverted their oaths and distorted law for Nazi
advantage, high-ranking Wehrmacht and SS officers who were
responsible for a host of atrocities, leaders of the Foreign Minis-
try who had aided and abetted Nazi plans for illegal conquest
and industrialists who treated concentration camp inmates in
their employ as "less than slaves."
The Chief of Counsel for the twelve subsequent Nuremberg
trials was Brigadier General Telford Taylor, a Harvard Law
School graduate who had served with Justice Jackson. (We
later became law partners in New York and Taylor went on to
become Emeritus Professor at Columbia Law School and
Yeshiva University.) In his 1949 "Final Report to the Secretary
of the Army," General Taylor emphasized that the most impor-
tant crime within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunals
19981
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was war-making itself. In the "Ministries Case" it was held
that the German conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia (na-
tions that surrendered without firing a shot), constituted a
"crime against peace." Not only was it held to be criminal to
conquer another country by military force, but it is no less a
crime to conquer by overwhelming military threats.
It was also made clear in Control Council Law No. 10, and
some of the subsequent judgments (Einsatzgruppen and Hos-
tages cases) that, contrary to the view of the IMT, crimes
against humanity, "are crimes against international law even
when committed by nationals of one country against their fellow
nationals or against those of other nations irrespective of bellig-
erent status." Taylor correctly noted that the main achieve-
ment of additional war crimes trials was the further
clarification and elucidation of international law. He cautioned
that unless governments seriously endeavored to establish a
permanent international penal jurisdiction, and to take steps to
enforce the Nuremberg principles, the Germans would conclude
(erroneously) that Nuremberg was "for Germans only."
Please allow me a personal aside. General Taylor desig-
nated me the Chief Prosecutor for what was known as the "Ein-
satzgruppen Case." Twenty-two defendants were indicted in
that trial - and convicted - of murdering over a million peo-
ple. Thirteen of the accused, including six SS Generals, were
sentenced to death; the others to prison terms. Relying on cap-
tured top secret German reports, I was able to rest the prosecu-
tion's case after only two days. The defense, with its alibis,
denials and excuses, went on for months before being refuted.
A brief extract from the Opening Statement may reflect the
spirit that animated the prosecution:
May it please your Honors:
It is with sorrow and with hope that we here disclose the deliber-
ate slaughter of more than a million innocent and defenseless
men, women and children. This was the tragic fulfillment of a
program of intolerance and arrogance. Vengeance is not our goal,
nor do we seek merely a just retribution. We ask this Court to
affirm by international penal action man's right to live in peace
[Vol. 10:203
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and dignity regardless of his race or creed. The case we present is
a plea of humanity to law. .... 4
After detailing some of the crimes committed by each defend-
ant, I concluded with the warning:
The defendants in the dock were the cruel executioners, whose
terror wrote the blackest page in human history. Death was their
tool and life was their toy. If these men be immune, then law has
lost its meaning and man must live in fear.
Those words were spoken in the Nuremberg courtroom on
29 September 1947. I was then 27 years old. It was my first
case. Fifty years later, on 18 September 1997, my warning was
quoted by President Antonio Cassese of the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in concluding his annual Report to
the General Assembly of the United Nations. I am still making
"a plea of humanity to law." A plea for a permanent interna-
tional criminal court which will deter aggression and other
crimes against humanity so that people everywhere may live
without fear in peace and human dignity.
IV. WAR CRIMES TRIALS AFTER NUREMBERG
A. Tokyo and Other Trials
The International Military Tribunal in particular, and the
twelve subsequent trials at Nuremberg, laid the basic founda-
tions for the later development of international criminal law.
No sooner was World War II brought to a halt than the United
States army conducted a number of war crimes trials held, sym-
bolically, in the former German concentration camp at Dachau.5
The defendants put on trial by the U.S. army (even before the
Nuremberg trials began) were captured Nazi officers and
guards accused of responsibility for crimes committed in the
camps. Also indicted were Germans who had committed atroci-
ties against captured Allied prisoners of war. These proceedings
4 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
THE EINSATZGRUPPEN CASE 30 (1949).
5 I was a war crimes investigator during World War II and, as a Sergeant of
Infantry, entered several concentration camps to collect evidence of the atrocities
committed there. The searing horrors I witnessed certainly enhanced my determi-
nation to help create a more humane world.
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were in the nature of traditional courts-martial or military com-
missions enforcing customary rules of war.
Similar war crimes trials took place in the zones occupied
by the British, French and Soviet military governments. Many
suspects were returned to the scene of their crimes to stand
trial. The post-war German governments (East and West) later
conducted a large number of "denazification" proceedings, war
crimes investigations and a considerable number of prosecu-
tions against their own nationals. With the passage of time,
such proceedings became increasingly difficult, and the number
of convictions waned, as did the severity of sentences. Nonethe-
less, the published decisions, of varying quality and durability,
added to the growing body of war crimes law and precedents.
Programs of restitution and compensation to Nazi victims,
particularly by the West German government, helped to bring a
measure of recompense to the victims. It was my privilege to
direct the U.S. Military Government program to recover heir-
less property and to use the proceeds for the benefit of survi-
vors. I helped to negotiate the so-called "reparations treaty"
between West Germany, the State of Israel and a consortium of
major Jewish organizations that I represented as Counsel. In
that capacity, I organized and directed a vast legal-aid network
throughout the world to assist needy Nazi victims with their
compensation claims. These efforts helped to diminish bitter-
ness and hatred by demonstrating that, whatever may have
been the shortcomings, an historic initiative was being taken to
redress some of the injuries. Coupled with the attempt to bring
major criminals to justice, the restitution efforts helped to cre-
ate an atmosphere more conducive to future peace.
While the Nuremberg trials were still in progress, a similar
trial against Japanese Ministers, Ambassadors, Admirals and
Generals was taking place in Tokyo. General Douglas MacAr-
thur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Far
East, appointed military tribunals to try Japanese leaders ac-
cused of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The court was composed of judges from eleven countries that
had been at war with Japan. The trial before the IMT for the
Far East (IMTFE) lasted more than two years and was the big-
gest trial in recorded history. All of the accused were found
guilty and seven were sentenced to hang.
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There were several dissenting opinions. Judge Pal of India
argued that none of the defendants should have been convicted,
since all nations and leaders should share some responsibility
for the war and its inevitable consequences. His thoughtful
opinion argued that human compassion was an integral part of
justice, reflecting the feeling that war breeds criminality, and
the only effective way to achieve justice is to maintain peace.
For many of the Japanese, the trials in the Far East were
considered more vengeance than justice. They pointed to the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as manifestations
of U.S. inhumanity and hypocrisy. The residue of such senti-
ments continues to this day. Japan's leaders honor their war
heroes but fail to compensate victims of Japanese atrocities.
Post-war Germany provided over one hundred billion DM to in-
demnify victims of Nazi persecution. The United States pro-
vided compensation to its citizens of Japanese descent who were
unlawfully interned as security-risks after the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. But the post-war Japanese governments have
not yet fully come to grips with their past. They have even
failed to provide compensation to the many women from occu-
pied territories who were abducted to become what the Japa-
nese euphemistically call "comfort women." There is nothing
comfortable about being forced to submit to mass rapes in bor-
dellos provided as recreation for Japanese soldiers. This
shameful chapter of Japanese history has yet to be adequately
redressed. Creating a world of justice and peace requires more
dedication and effort than has thus far been demonstrated. Of
course, victims of crimes against humanity, wherever they may
be, should, as far as possible, be entitled to appropriate com-
pensation from those who caused the injury.
The Nuremberg tribunals were dissolved and the Prosecu-
tors went home. Only a small sampling of criminals (less than
200) could be brought to justice in the thirteen Nuremberg tri-
als. It had been the pledge of both Justice Robert Jackson and
General Telford Taylor, speaking as authorized representatives
of the United States, that these trials were never intended to be
"victor's justice" but were meant to marshal in a new era which
made aggression, crimes against humanity and war crimes pun-
ishable under binding international law that would apply
equally to all nations and their leaders. The instrumentality
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most competent to consider the implementation of this prom-
ised new rule of world law was the United Nations.
B. Codification of Law via the United Nations
The first General Assembly of the new United Nations
(U.N.) unanimously affirmed the legal principles laid down in
the Charter and Judgment of the IMT: aggression, war crimes
and crimes against humanity were punishable crimes for which
even a head of state could be held to account. Superior orders
would be no excuse but could be considered in mitigation. In-
spired by the horrors revealed at the Nuremberg trials, the As-
sembly promptly passed another resolution calling for a
convention to prohibit and punish the crime of genocide, by such
a tribunal as might later prove acceptable to the parties. Ex-
perts were soon designated to draw up a Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind and to draft statutes for an
international criminal court to punish such offenses.
Committees of distinguished jurists from many nations be-
gan to codify international penal law and to consider the estab-
lishment of a permanent international criminal court. Nations
with different legal systems, cultures and perceptions had dif-
fering views as to what was appropriate, desirable or possible.
Comprehensive drafts were debated in 1951 and 1953 but cold-
war rivalries, plus the reluctance of states to curb their sover-
eignty, blocked effective action. The old excuse again heard
from diplomats was that "the time was not yet ripe." The
United Nations, of course, was completely dependent upon its
sovereign state members. Many experts agreed that the differ-
ences could have been reconciled if there had been sufficient
political will to do so. But, unfortunately, that decisive political
ingredient was absent. The situation was further exacerbated
by the "cold-war" between the capitalist United States and the
communist Soviet Union and their respective allies. The result
was that progress was stymied and the desired consensus was
beyond reach.
To justify the inaction, it was argued that there was no
need for an international criminal court until there was agree-
ment on the code of crimes to be enforced by the court. Further-
more there was no possibility of agreeing on the code unless
there was agreement on the definition of "aggression," which
[Vol. 10:203218
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/9
THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
was the most serious of all international crimes. Without such
a definition there could be no code of crimes and without a code
there was no need for a court. The only thing left to do was to
try to reach agreement on the definition of aggression. That
took about 25 years.
As the cold-war thawed, it was possible for the U.N. to
reach a consensus definition of aggression in 1974. It was not a
very good definition since, in order to reach consensus, it was
necessary to include several clauses of such deliberate ambigu-
ity as to allow states to by-pass the apparent restraints. The
definition was intended as a guide to the Security Council that
was vested with U.N. Charter responsibility for determining
when aggression had occurred. In fact, the definition confirmed
that only the Security Council had authority to determine that
fact. The Council never relied on the definition and it was later
argued that the definition lacked the precision required by a pe-
nal statute. These flaws would not have been insurmountable
had states really been willing to abandon aggressive war as an
instrument of national policy, as required by the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact of 1928 and the U.N. Charter. But all that could be
achieved at that time was a willingness to resume work on the
draft code of crimes and the international criminal court that
had been lying idle. The International Law Commission, a
body of supposedly independent experts, not noted for their
speed, was asked to resume work on those moribund projects.
In the meantime, the world went back to killing as usual.
C. International Crimes Continue Unabated
There is no need to recount here all of the instances since
the end of World War II when nations and armies resumed
their aggressions, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Since the U.N. Charter proclaimed its primary purpose: "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war," over 100 mil-
lion people have been killed in over a hundred armed conflicts
around the world. One need only mention names like Pol Pot,
Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein and many others to conjure up
images of Hitler, Himmler, and Stalin. Korea, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Iran, Iraq, the Middle-East, Africa, Latin America, Eu-
rope, Afghanistan and many other places became killing fields
where enormous numbers of innocent people were massacred,
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subjected to crimes against humanity and victimized by aggres-
sions and war crimes while the international community stood
helplessly by and let it happen - to their everlasting shame!
When Iraq committed brazen aggression by attacking its
friendly neighboring Arab state of Kuwait, the United Nations
Security Council, spurred by the United States with its enor-
mous oil interests in the area, finally did what it was supposed
to do under the U.N. Charter. When its many resolutions call-
ing upon Iraq to desist were scorned, a flurry of new resolutions
authorized an international military force (led by the United
States) to use all necessary means to drive out the aggressors.
After Iraq was routed, the Council imposed a host of new condi-
tions and sanctions designed to secure peace in the area in the
future. These included reparations to those who had been
injured.
What was glaringly absent was U.N.-authorized action to
bring to justice those who were responsible for the aggression,
the crimes against humanity and the clear violations of the laws
of war that accompanied Iraq's unlawful invasion of Kuwait. As
should have been expected, the world community has had noth-
ing but grief from Iraq ever since. Instead of following the Nu-
remberg principle of punishing only the guilty after a fair trial,
economic sanctions were imposed on the civilian population of
Iraq, many of whom might have disagreed with the aggressive
policies of their government. Saddam Hussein, Iraq's despotic
leader, remains at the head of the government and thumbs his
nose at the world community's efforts to curb his production of
weapons of mass destruction. The lessons of Nuremberg seem
to have been forgotten.
The situation changed when, following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, former multi-ethnic Yugoslavia fell apart.
Rival ethnic groups declared their independence as sovereign
states and, around 1991, sought to unify or expand their na-
tional territories by force. Television broadcasts in 1992 vividly
portrayed concentration camps in Bosnia and Serbia, the likes
of which had not been seen since Buchenwald and Dachau. Re-
liable newspapers reported that thousands of Moslem women
were being systematically raped and then murdered by Croats
or Serbs determined to clear the area for their own groups. A
new phrase was coined, "ethnic cleansing," to describe the bru-
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tal driving out of ethnic minorities from regions claimed by
those of different religious persuasion or origin. There is noth-
ing "clean" about the filthy practice reminiscent of Nazi geno-
cide against Jews, gypsies and others. Nor were the crimes
limited to one side only. Finally, unfortunately too late to pre-
vent the crimes, the Security Council decided to act.
D. The Security Council Intervenes
In 1992, the Security Council established a Commission of
Experts to investigate evidence of violations of humanitarian
law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Its Chairman,
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of DePaul University, a distin-
guished expert on international criminal law, managed (under
very difficult circumstances) to amass an enormous amount of
evidence to document the reported atrocities. It was no longer
possible for the world to do nothing. Having been humiliated by
its failure to restore peace and arrest criminals in Somalia, the
United States was not willing to send its troops into former Yu-
goslavia. But the time had come to apply the rule of law to pun-
ish past criminality and to deter future criminality in former
Yugoslavia.
1. An Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Once the political will to act was aroused, the U.N. Security
Council was able to create the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia in very short order. Comprehensive draft stat-
utes for an international criminal tribunal had been prepared
by special U.N. committees in 1951 and 1953 and expert groups
had also detailed how such a court could be created. A Council
resolution of February 22, 1993, called upon the Secretary-Gen-
eral to submit statutes for an ad hoc international criminal tri-
bunal within 60 days. It was done. The Tribunal came into
existence on May 25. The new court, with its seat in the Hague,
was the first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg.
This is not to suggest that it was an easy birth; quite the
contrary. There were enormous problems with staffing, fund-
ing, training and obtaining cooperation and support and over-
coming logistical, legal and procedural problems that no one
could have foreseen. Difficult investigations, including exhuma-
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tion of mass graves, the formation of sensitive units to deal with
female victims and witnesses (particularly in mass rape cases),
the assignment of competent defense counsel, translators, se-
curity personnel and administrators all presented novel
problems that had to be overcome. These difficulties were
overcome.
The Tribunal was fortunate to obtain the services of Profes-
sor Antonio Cassese, a renowned international legal scholar of
Italy, as President of the Tribunal. The first Chief Prosecutor,
Richard Goldstone (who resigned and was replaced in October
1996 by esteemed Judge Louise Arbour of Canada), was a
Supreme Court judge and famous human rights advocate from
South Africa. Eleven experienced judges, including Texan
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, came from different legal systems.
Their carefully reasoned opinions reflected the high calibre of
the new court.
The number of prosecutions by the ICTY during its forma-
tive years has been limited. Only a few cases were completed
and appeals are still pending. Most of the accused are still at
liberty. But every newborn must first crawl before it can walk or
run. Perhaps the biggest disappointment has been the failure
of the Security Council to enforce its own mandates. High-
ranking persons who have been indicted for genocide, mass
killings, rape and "ethnic cleansing" continue to walk the
streets of former Yugoslavia with apparent impunity. A few ar-
rests have recently been made by international forces assigned
to maintain peace but the Council has relied on the states con-
cerned to apprehend criminals within their territories. Such
states as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika
Srpska refuse all cooperation, arguing that under their consti-
tutions, it is illegal to hand their national over to a foreign
court.
The ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia is an organ of the Secur-
ity Council created pursuant to the U.N. Charter. All U.N.
members are legally bound to support Charter mandates. That
has not been done. It sets a very dangerous precedent if the
Council, to which the maintenance of peace has been entrusted,
allows its orders to be flouted with impunity. The absence of
any independent enforcement mechanism or financial resources
seriously handicaps the new court. Nonetheless, in reporting to
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the United Nations nearly four years after the Tribunal was es-
tablished, President Cassese described the Tribunal as "a vi-
brant, fully functioning judicial body." Let us hope that it will
get even more vibrant with time. It is up to the public to de-
mand of their political leaders that complete support, by every
available means, be given to the ICTY for it is opening a new
legal horizon on which the peace of humanity may depend.
2. An Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)
In 1994, a brutal civil war erupted between rival ethnic
tribes in Rwanda. There were reports that perhaps half-a-mil-
lion Tutsi and their supporters were being savagely massacred
by the dominant Hutu government. The Security Council sent
a small commission to investigate and it soon reported back
that the crimes being committed were horrendous: many
thousands of men, women and children were being hacked to
bits with machetes or bludgeoned to death with clubs in organ-
ized rampages of tribal animosity. It did not take the Security
Council long to react to the public cries of outrage. United Na-
tions forces were dispatched to Rwanda to help restore order to
that battered country. Hutu guerrillas continued to battle a
Tutsi army, while hundreds of thousand of refugees fled in ter-
ror. Once more the Security Council moved swiftly to create an
ad hoc international criminal court to bring the wrongdoers to
justice as a means of helping to maintain peace.
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda was adopted at the end of 1994. It closely followed the
general outline of the ICTFY, but was more explicit in assuring
that even in a civil conflict violations of the rules of war would
not be tolerated. The Court was authorized to prosecute for ge-
nocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes regardless of
whether the strife was called an international conflict or a civil
war. Because of the nature of the internal conflict, the inclusion
of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the court was
not relevant. Only the specified crimes committed within the
defined area during the year 1994 could be dealt with. The
Rwanda court was thus a special tribunal of very limited
jurisdiction.
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To save money and personnel, the ICTR was to have the
same Chief Prosecutor as the tribunal for crimes committed in
former Yugoslavia, and they would also share the same appel-
late chambers. Because Rwanda itself was largely devastated
and lacked appropriate facilities, it was decided to locate the
new ICTR not in Rwanda but in Arusha, in neighboring
Tanzania. The new government of Rwanda, now led by a Tutsi,
promptly arrested over 100,000 Hutu people and others who
were charged with genocide, mass rapes and mass murders.
These suspects jammed the local jails of Rwanda that were to-
tally inadequate. Few lawyers and even fewer judges were left
in the country. Neither the ICTY in the Hague nor the ICTR
(with one foot in the Hague and the other in Tanzania) allowed
the death penalty, which had been outlawed by the European
Convention on Human Rights. Yet, many of those who had
been victimized and had seen their entire families wiped out by
their neighbors of different ethnic affiliation demanded immedi-
ate justice; which meant death to the murderers.
Meanwhile, rival militias were still fighting and hiding in
refugee camps in neighboring countries where the killings con-
tinued. Despite such enormous obstacles, the new government
of Rwanda was thoroughly dedicated to re-establishing law and
order in their devastated country. Minister of Justice Faustus
Ntezelyayo and Chief Justice Laity Kama met with supporters
in Europe and appealed for help and guidance. They were de-
termined to overcome the difficulties. In contrast to the ICTY in
the Hague, the Rwanda court had more suspects in detention
than they could possibly cope with quickly. National courts be-
gan screening and classifying offenders according to the sever-
ity of their crimes before they could be tried by rather summary
proceedings in local courts.
The administrative problems faced by the ICTR in Arusha
were even greater than those encountered by the new Yugosla-
via criminal court in the Hague. Allegations of improprieties
were promptly dealt with by U.N. inspectors and ineffective per-
sonnel were replaced. Undaunted, the ICTR began to conduct
trials against some of the accused leaders in the court's custody.
These international trials are now pending and witnesses are
being heard in proceedings where the rights of the accused,
some of high office, are being protected as well as the rights of
[Vol. 10:203
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/9
THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
victims and witnesses who cannot reveal their identities with-
out jeopardizing themselves or their families. It is another on-
going effort that illustrates humankind's determination to
move, despite all difficulties, toward reconciliation, peace and
justice by applying the rule of law.
Reports of similar atrocities in many other countries
(Burundi, Algeria and the Congo, for example) continued to ap-
pear in the media and pour into U.N. headquarters. The Secur-
ity Council again considered the appointment of investigative
commissions and the possibility of creating still another ad hoc
criminal tribunal. Temporary tribunals, created after the
event, and with only limited jurisdiction to deal with a few par-
ticular crimes in certain areas, only within a limited time
frame, are better than doing nothing. But it is certainly not
good enough. Law, to be worthy of its name, must apply equally
to everyone, everywhere. What is needed now is a permanent
international criminal court to condemn major crimes that
threaten the peace and security of all human beings. It is the
next logical step in the evolution of international criminal law.
The challenge that now faces the world community is whether
the time has finally come for the force of law to replace the law
of force.
V. COURTING A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. U.N. Prepares for an International Criminal Court (ICC)
We have noted that soon after the U.N. was formed, special
committees began deliberations for the establishment of a per-
manent international criminal jurisdiction (as it was then
called) and a code of international crimes to be enforced by a
new international criminal court. These duties eventually de-
volved upon the International Law Commission (ILC) that is
now composed of 34 legal experts from diverse regions.
The initiative for putting an international criminal court
back on the agenda of the United Nations came in 1989 from
Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson of Trinidad and Tobago, who
had long been interested in the subject and who found that his
country needed help in coping with international drug-traffick-
ers. It was 1994 before the ILC, under prodding from the Gen-
eral Assembly, completed its 60-article draft Statute for an
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International Criminal Court. In 1996, it completed its Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
The necessary legal building blocks were thus put in place and
the path was finally cleared for closing a glaring gap in the in-
ternational legal order.
Beginning in 1994, the General Assembly established a
number of successive committees to begin work on creating a
permanent international criminal court, using the ILC draft as
a basis. Of course, views varied and there was much hesitation
about accepting such a drastic innovation. Many small states
did not see the relevance of such a tribunal and some powerful
states were quite content with the existing legal order based on
military might. But, as the issues were slowly clarified, and it
became apparent that the Security Council, dominated by the
"Big-5"6 with veto powers, could create ad hoc tribunals with-
out further consultation, and that such "ad hocs" left much to be
desired, the feeling began to grow that an independent perma-
nent court set up before the crimes were committed would bet-
ter serve the interests of world peace. By the end of 1996, the
General Assembly was able to request the Preparatory Com-
mittee (PrepCom) to negotiate a consolidated text of a Conven-
tion or Statute that could be widely accepted in a treaty
creating a permanent international criminal court. Italy agreed
to host the final meetings that would take place in Rome during
June and July 1998.
To be sure, the differences in points of view among 185
members of the United Nations, and their lawyers, remain
quite substantial. Debates on the terms and terminology of the
draft continued in intermittent but intensive sessions through-
out 1996 and 1997 and will continue in the spring of 1998. De-
spite very skillful efforts by "PrepCom" Chairman Adriaan Bos,
Legal Adviser to the Netherlands, delegates submitted a flurry
of proposals for additions, clarifications, amendments or dele-
tions. Even consolidated texts remained encumbered with
brackets indicating absence of consensus on many points.
On the positive side, it may be noted that, in recent negotia-
tions, no state has taken the floor in opposition to the creation of
an international criminal court. Practically all states agree
6 The "Big-5" are the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and
Russia.
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that such a tribunal is desirable. U.S. President William J.
Clinton, addressing the General Assembly on September 22,
1997, said:
"To punish those responsible for crimes against humanity and to
promote justice so that peace endures, we must maintain our
strong support for the U.N.'s war crimes tribunals and truth com-
missions. And before the century ends, we should establish a per-
manent international court to prosecute the most serious
violations of humanitarian law."
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, addressing the Interna-
tional Bar Association on 12 June 1997, echoed similar senti-
ments of his predecessor Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he said:
"The international criminal court is the symbol of our highest
hopes for this unity of peace and justice. It is a vital part of an
emerging system of international human rights protection."
The United States U.N. Representative, Ambassador Bill Rich-
ardson, expressed the view of many when he said:
"The time has come to create an international criminal court that
is fair, efficient and effective, and that serves as a deterrent and a
mechanism of accountability in the years to come."
How to formulate a statute that will satisfy the parties - in-
cluding the skeptics - that the new international criminal
court will be "fair, efficient and effective?" There's the rub!
B. Major Points of Contention
1. Who Has Priority, National Courts or the ICC?
There seemed to be general agreement that an ICC would
have jurisdiction only where national courts were unable or un-
willing to deal with the crime in a fair way. The delegates
called this "complementarity" to emphasize that the ICC was
intended to complement, not replace, national courts. But such
major crimes as genocide, aggression and crimes against hu-
manity are almost invariably committed by or with the conni-
vance of a national state, which can hardly be expected to try
itself. The ICC itself must be authorized to determine when it
has priority. Finding the proper balance and agreed formula-
tions in an interrelated and coherent text presented continuing
problems.
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2. What Crimes Fall Within the Jurisdiction of the Court?
All seemed agreed that the ICC should deal only with ex-
ceptionally serious crimes of major concern to the international
community - so called "core crimes." The ILC draft listed only
5 categories of such crimes: genocide, aggression, serious war
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes established pursu-
ant to nine specified treaties that had been widely accepted to
curb war atrocities, terrorist acts (against aircraft, ships, diplo-
mats or hostages) and drug trafficking. Norway suggested that
additions to the "core crimes" might be considered at a review
conference in the future. The inclusion of aggression and
"treaty crimes" raised problems.
Some felt that aggression, which the Nuremberg tribunal
had condemned as the supreme international crime, had not
been adequately defined (despite the U.N. consensus definition
of 1974) and that its inclusion might impair the independence of
the court. It was feared that the Security Council might inter-
fere with the ICC for political reasons. Germany, with strong
support from many nations, proposed a compromise whereby
the Security Council would, as the U.N. Charter requires, first
have to determine that aggression by a state had occurred, but
any prosecution against individual leaders alleged to be respon-
sible for the crime was to be left completely to the independent
judgment of the ICC without any interference from the Council.
The independence of the court could be specifically reaffirmed
and the tribunal could balance matters by acquitting the ac-
cused if it did not agree with the Council's conclusion that ag-
gression by a state had occurred. Whether war itself was a
crime might have to be resolved by the plenipotentiaries meet-
ing in Rome. It will be a test of their statesmanship as we enter
the 21st century.
3. Who is Bound by What?
There was general agreement that the ICC would be estab-
lished by a multilateral treaty. Some argued that accepting the
treaty automatically vested the ICC with authority to hold any
of the signatories' nationals responsible if they violated any
"core crimes." Others objected to such "inherent jurisdiction"
and preferred the "opt-in" or "a-la-carte" system contained in
the ILC Draft whereby, before ratification, a state might pick
[Vol. 10:203
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/9
THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
and choose which crimes it would declare to be binding on itself.
This would, it was argued, encourage acceptability by more
states and thus lead toward the desired goal of universality.
Criminal law expert Professor Roger Clark of Rutgers Univer-
sity, appearing as the delegate of Samoa, asked how states
could legally opt-out and avoid responsibility for crimes that
were already universally condemned under common interna-
tional law?
4. Powers of the Prosecutor
Many felt that the Prosecutor (male or female) should be
given broad powers to investigate charges from almost any re-
sponsible source and decide ex officio whether indictment was
warranted. Some argued that only state parties could lodge a
complaint. Others, particularly those coming from continental
law systems, wanted judicial review of the Prosecutor's discre-
tion by some form of pre-trial chamber in order to assure proper
balance and protection of the defendant's rights. Professor Bas-
siouni, as a delegate of Egypt, argued that such a judicial
chamber would assure consistency and could help the Prosecu-
tor in obtaining cooperation from reluctant states.
Guarding traditional notions of sovereignty, some argued
that no prosecutions could be initiated without prior consent
from various concerned states: where the accused was being de-
tained or where the crime had occurred, the victim's state and
the state of which the accused was a national. But, if the states
were supporters of the criminal acts, these hurdles might prove
insurmountable. Michael Keegan, of the ICTY, pleaded to allow
the Prosecutor greater discretion. His colleague, William
Fenrick, feared that if the Prosecutor had to obtain consent
prior to on-site inspections or exhumations, local officials could
frustrate vital investigations. Professor Clark warned about
creating a "toothless" ICC.
The ILC draft, in a provision strongly supported by the
United states and even more strongly opposed by many smaller
states, prohibited any prosecution "arising from a situation" be-
ing dealt with by the Security Council, unless the Security
Council gave its prior consent. This aroused suspicions and
strong objections of many non- Security Council members who
feared that the Security Council could paralyze the ICC and de-
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stroy its independence. Singapore suggested a sensible compro-
mise: allow the ICC to proceed unless the Council decided
otherwise. Greece added another useful safeguard: set a time-
limit within which the Council had to act or consent would be
implied.
5. Procedural Problems:
All agreed that the accused had to be guaranteed a fair
trial. The ILC draft prescribed how the trial was to be con-
ducted and the principles of law to be respected, such as the
right of the accused to be present, to be presumed innocent and
protected against double jeopardy or the death penalty. But
lawyers coming from different legal systems had different views
about substance and wording. Many felt that such details could
be left to the Rules which the ICC or the parties could later
agree upon. Others felt that protecting the rights of witnesses
and the accused was paramount and could not be left to the
later discretion of the judges. At times, it seemed that the legal
experts were trying to anticipate every possible future problem
and to elaborate in detail just how it should be resolved in a way
that would satisfy their own legal or political system.
6. Striving for Consensus:
In its search for common ground before the wrap-up meet-
ings in Rome, the PrepCom divided itself into different teams,
or working groups, to seek agreement on the substance and
wording of the interlocking provisions of the proposed statute.
Some focused on "Definitions and Elements of Crimes" (such as
what activities should be considered "war crimes" and whether
internal conflicts are to be governed by such restraints); others
sought agreement on "General Principles of Criminal Law" that
should be applicable (such as permissible defenses, mental inca-
pacity, for example, or trial of minors etc.); some dealt with
"Procedural Matters" or how to assure appropriate "Interna-
tional Cooperation and Judicial Assistance" (whether extradi-
tion treaties were applicable, whether prosecutors could
investigate or arrest without prior approval, and how coopera-
tion could be enforced against a reluctant state) or which "Pen-
alties" would be applicable and whether compensation to
victims should be covered. Every participant was offered an op-
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portunity to present a modification of any proposal, a tempta-
tion that many competent lawyers, unfortunately, could not
resist.
Many issues, on which reasonable men and women might
differ, could hardly be adequately reconciled within the allotted
time and will have to be carried over for further deliberation
during the final pre-Rome sessions in New York scheduled for
March 16 to April 3, 1998. New working groups will then con-
sider the "Composition and Administration of the Court and its
Relationship to the United Nations." The definition and inclu-
sion of aggression will require more discussion and several pro-
cedural questions that had to be deferred for lack of time will be
open for debate. If, as seems likely, it will be impossible to
reach agreement on many non-vital procedural details, it may
be necessary to authorize the tribunal itself to establish or pro-
pose its own rules within approved guidelines.
Since the entire statute consists of articles that are interre-
lated in many ways, the final text requires a comprehensive
overview in order to obtain a well coordinated and cohesive
whole. Many nations participating in the debate come from dif-
ferent social and legal traditions, and may be distrustful of the
intentions of some of their adversaries. It is understandable
that there may be extreme caution before accepting com-
promises with uncertain consequences. Different ministries,
foreign affairs, national defense or judicial, may approach the
problems from a different perspective, thus further exacerbat-
ing the difficulties.
All loose ends will have to be tied together in a report to the
Diplomatic Conference that will clearly set forth the major
points of difference and the options (indicated by remaining
bracketed texts) so that the Plenipotentiaries, hopefully, can
reach compromises and agree upon a final text ready for signa-
ture by the maximum number of countries. It will not be easy.
But it can be done and it must be done for the sake of a more
humane and peaceful world.
C. Where Do We Go From Here?
Many articles and issues of the draft statute, prepared by
the International Law Commission, remain to be clarified. If
there is general agreement regarding changes to the ILC draft,
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the improvements should be made. Where general agreement
is absent, compromise is vital. The search for consensus is de-
sirable, but it must not be allowed to become a trap in which the
lowest common denominator becomes the norm. Nor should ap-
parent unanimity be reached by adopting vague, exculpating
phrases designed to enable states to avoid legal obligations
which they purport to accept. Powerful nations are surely
tempted to retain the advantages of power just as less powerful
states understandably resent being deprived of democratic
equality. No nation or person should be above the law and the
innocent need never fear the rule of law. By accepting clearly
binding minimum rules of the road, all nations can better serve
their citizens who are the real sovereigns of modem society.
The proposed treaty does not deal with the past, but only
with the future. It can go into effect only after a still-unspeci-
fied number of states have ratified it. Treaties customarily bind
only the signatory parties in accordance with the terms of their
acceptance. Additional checks and balances already exist to
prevent the tribunal from becoming an instrument of tyranny:
judges must be qualified and democratically elected, prosecu-
tors and other staff members who fail in their duty can be re-
moved from office, budgets are subject to control, and
proceedings must be transparent for all the world to see. Pos-
sibilities for corruption, venality and inefficiency can be found
in courts everywhere, but to suggest that because abuses are
imaginable courts should not exist is to doubt the rule of law
itself. There must be greater confidence that judges and prose-
cutors will not betray their trust.
No provision is made in the statute for independent financ-
ing of the tribunal or enforcement of its judgments or decrees.
These are obvious shortcomings that must be considered and
eventually resolved. No court can be effective unless it can rely
on the good faith of nations prepared to be bound by its terms.
Some unanticipated defects will surely materialize, but if there
is confidence and good will they can surely be overcome. Those
whom history has placed in a position to influence the future
course of history must ask themselves what kind of a world they
want. If they are distressed by the injustices and violence all
around them, they should decide that the time is ripe to act and
the time to act is now.
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An amazing number of non-governmental associations from
all over the world crowded the meetings of the PrepCom and
submitted detailed proposals designed to enhance and expedite
the work of the committee. Such renowned groups as Amnesty
International and many respected human rights agencies, as
well as European Law Students Associations and former Nu-
remberg Prosecutors joined in a "Coalition for an International
Criminal Court." This coalition has embraced hundreds of con-
cerned private organizations seeking to place fundamental
human rights of all men, women and children under the protec-
tive shield of an independent system of international criminal
justice. Whether nations can meet the challenge by creating a
permanent ICC remains to be seen when the conference of
plenipotentiaries meets in Rome in the summer of 1998.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nuremberg Tribunals were a precedent and a promise.
As part of the universal determination to avoid the scourge of
war, legal precedents were created that outlawed wars of ag-
gression, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The im-
plied promise held forth to the world was that such crimes
would be condemned in the future wherever they occurred and
that no person or nation would be above the law. After half a
century, it now seems possible that the promise may yet be
fulfilled.
Out of the tragedies of war came the hope and expectation
that lawyers and statesmen could fashion a new legal system to
help curb ancient habits of cruelty and killing. People who had
seen too much suffering were reaching toward a more tranquil
world in which persons everywhere could feel more secure
under a mantle of legal protection against the worst forms of
violent abuse. Nuremberg and similar proceedings were part of
a process reflecting humankind's slow and difficult movement
toward a more humane civilization.
There can be no instant evolution. Old and revered tradi-
tions can only be altered slowly to meet new needs in an ever-
changing society. The world stands poised on the brink of tak-
ing an important step to close a glaring gap in the existing legal
order. With sufficient imagination and determination it is pos-
sible to reach widespread agreement on binding new rules for
1998]
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the safety and well-being of people everywhere. It is inconceiv-
able that man can invent the means for his own destruction, yet
lack the intellectual capacity to prevent it from happening.
To condemn massive atrocities, without creating an effec-
tive method to apprehend and bring the criminals to justice, is
to mock the victims and encourage more criminality. Of course,
it is necessary and useful that views of all nations are respect-
fully canvassed on issues that affect their welfare and indepen-
dence. But the search for desired consensus must not be
allowed to dilute and thereby undermine the vital substance of
needed accords. Lawyers should deal with the heart of the
problems and not be dithering about relatively insignificant de-
tails as humankind cries out to halt the incessant crimes
against humanity. Do we need more Holocausts to prod us out
of indecision?
Understandably, smaller nations fear that a politically ori-
ented Security Council might jeopardize the independence of a
permanent judiciary. To gain greater acceptance as the impar-
tial guardian of peace, Security Council reforms will be re-
quired. Its composition must be more democratic and its
privileged vetoes restrained. It must also adopt new rules to
assure that it will impartially carry out its Charter obligation to
serve the peace of all nations large and small. Such security
Council changes are part of an evolutionary process that will
take time, but the process has already started. The most that
can be done for an international criminal court now is to com-
plete the treaty in Rome, by compromise, as expeditiously and
effectively as possible, without losing sight of the ultimate goal
and faith that it can be reached.
How long it will take before powerful nations ratify any
treaty that may curb outmoded notions of sovereignty cannot be
predicted. If the treaty route should fail or falter, a logical al-
ternative would be action by the Security Council, which has
both power and authority to set up limited tribunals, quickly if
a threat to the peace demands such action. Hopefully, with in-
sistence by groups dedicated to protecting human rights and
with help from institutions teaching tolerance and understand-
ing, it will be possible to persuade decision-makers that delay
can be detrimental and dangerous and that all nations, in their
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own interest, should sign the pending treaty and move quickly
toward its undiluted ratification.
In its search for new international institutions to maintain
peace and human dignity, the legal community is itself on trial.
It has a unique opportunity to acquit itself nobly. The basic
standards articulated at Nuremberg must be upheld in Rome.
The time has come to take a chance for peace.
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